Edward Thomas’s “Parting” is not merely a poem of farewell; it is a quiet, devastating meditation on the transformation of suffering through time, the haunting architecture of memory, and the paradoxical serenity that follows emotional death. Written in the shadow of the First World War, yet untouched by direct reference to battle or bloodshed, the poem operates with the precision of a scalpel and the weight of a tombstone. It is a work of profound psychological realism, where the landscape of the past is not romanticized nor mourned in the conventional sense, but reimagined as an ethereal, silent realm—untouchable, unchanging, and strangely liberated from the agony that once defined it. In its economy of language and its philosophical depth, “Parting” stands as one of the most sophisticated and emotionally resonant lyric poems of the early twentieth century, offering a vision of memory that is neither nostalgic nor redemptive, but transcendent in its quiet detachment.

At first glance, the poem appears to be a simple reflection on the aftermath of a personal rupture—a parting from a loved one, perhaps a friend, a spouse, or even a version of the self. But to read it thus is to miss the deeper currents that flow beneath its surface. The opening line, “The Past is a strange land, most strange,” immediately establishes a tone of dislocation. The past is not a place one returns to in sentimentality, nor is it a repository of golden moments. It is “strange,” twice emphasized, as if the speaker himself is startled by its unfamiliarity. This strangeness is not born of distance in time, but of a radical transformation in the nature of experience. In this land, “Wind blows not there, nor does rain fall: / If they do, they cannot hurt at all.” The elemental forces that shape our earthly lives—wind, rain, the very weather of emotion—are absent or rendered harmless. There is no storm here, no tempest of feeling, no physical or psychological discomfort. What was once violent, what once tore at the nerves, now merely drifts like dust through a silent cathedral.

This is not a pastoral vision of peace, nor is it a religious vision of heaven. There is no divine presence, no celestial music, no angels. Instead, the past is rendered as a kind of afterlife of the psyche—a realm where the body has been shed, where sensation has been dissolved, and where the soul, if it can be called that, exists in a state of pure, untroubled remembrance. The men who inhabit this land are “of all kinds as equals,” suggesting a leveling of social hierarchies, but more importantly, a leveling of emotional intensity. In life, pain and pleasure were distinct, differentiated, often agonizingly opposed. Here, “Pleasure and pain there have no sting.” The distinction remains, but the power to wound has vanished. The speaker does not say that pain is erased, but that its sting is gone. This is a crucial distinction. The memory of suffering persists, but its capacity to inflict has been neutralized. This is not forgiveness, nor is it amnesia. It is something more profound: the transmutation of suffering into aesthetic form.

The next stanza deepens this transformation with startling clarity: “The perished self not suffering / That lacks all blood and nerve and wit.” Here, Thomas introduces the concept of the “perished self”—a phrase that carries the weight of both death and dissolution. The self that once felt, that once raged, that once wept, is no longer. It has been stripped of its biological and cognitive apparatus: no blood to carry the rush of adrenaline, no nerve to transmit the shock of pain, no wit to interpret or resist. What remains is “a shade,” a ghostly echo, a silhouette against the dim light of memory. The word “shade” is deliberately chosen—not specter, not spirit, not soul, but shade. It is insubstantial, passive, devoid of agency. This is not a spiritual ascent, but an existential erosion. The self is not elevated; it is diminished, reduced to a form that cannot act, cannot feel, cannot change. And yet, paradoxically, this diminishment is the source of peace.

It is here that the poem’s central irony emerges: the very thing that once caused anguish—the memory of the parting, the unresolved conflict, the angry words, the bitter silences—has, in the passage of time, become a source of quiet joy. “Remembered joy and misery / Bring joy to the joyous equally; / Both sadden the sad.” This is the emotional logic of memory: it does not alter the nature of the past, but it alters our relationship to it. The joyous, those who have found peace in their present, find comfort even in the recollection of sorrow, because it is no longer alive. The sad, those still burdened by loss, find their sorrow deepened by the memory of joy, because that joy, too, is gone. Memory, then, is not a mirror, but a prism—it refracts experience into new emotional spectra, dependent not on the original event, but on the state of the observer.

This leads to the poem’s most devastating insight: “Parting to-day a double pain.” The present parting is painful, yes—but it is made more painful by the intrusion of the past. Not because the past was worse, but because it is now better. The speaker does not lament the parting for its own sake, but for the way it resurrects a conflict that, in memory, has become strangely beautiful. “First because it was parting; next / Because the ill it ended vexed / And mocked me from the Past again.” The past, far from being a place of healing, is a place of mockery. It mocks the present because it has become, in its detachment, a kind of perfection. The “ill” that was once so tormenting—the arguments, the cold stares, the slammed doors—is now “no longer woe.” It has been purified. The “sighs, angry word and look and deed” have been faded, not erased, but softened, like ink on parchment left in the sun. And in their fading, they have become “a kind of bliss.”

This is the poem’s most radical departure from conventional elegiac tradition. In most poetry of loss, the past is idealized—loved ones become saints, conflicts become misunderstandings, wounds become lessons. Thomas does none of this. He does not say the past was beautiful. He says it became beautiful through its own death. The transformation is not moral, not spiritual, not redemptive—it is purely temporal. Time, not grace, is the agent of peace. The past is not redeemed; it is rendered harmless by its own irreversibility. The anger, the hurt, the resentment—all of it has been stripped of its power to act, to change, to wound. And in that powerlessness, it becomes serene. “For there spiritualized it lay / In the perpetual yesterday / That naught can stir or stain like this.” The word “spiritualized” is key. It does not mean sanctified or holy, but rather, made immaterial. The anger has been lifted from the flesh and placed into the realm of thought, where it can no longer touch the body. It is no longer a living wound, but a carved inscription on a stone.

This vision of memory as a kind of aesthetic afterlife finds its closest parallel not in religious doctrine, but in the philosophy of Proust, who similarly saw memory as a force that could transfigure suffering into art. But where Proust’s madeleine evokes a flood of sensory richness, Thomas’s past is stripped of all sensory detail. There is no smell of rain, no sound of footsteps, no texture of fabric. Only the emotional residue remains, purified, abstracted, eternal. The “perpetual yesterday” is not a return to the past, but a suspension of it—a moment that has been frozen, not by will, but by time’s indifferent passage. It cannot be stirred, because there is no one left to stir it. It cannot be stained, because there is no longer a self to be stained.

The emotional impact of this realization is not cathartic, but haunting. There is no resolution, no comfort, no sense of closure. The speaker does not say, “I have healed.” He says, “I am haunted by the peace of what I once suffered.” This is not a poem of acceptance, but of astonishment. The speaker is not at peace with the parting—he is bewildered by the fact that the very thing he once despised has become, in memory, a source of quiet, unassailable beauty. The pain of the present is doubled because it is contrasted with the serenity of the past. The past, in its silence and stillness, becomes the superior reality.

This is where the poem gains its profound cultural and historical resonance. Written in 1915, just as the war was consuming the young men of Britain, “Parting” speaks to a generation learning to live with irreversible loss. The soldiers who left for the front were not only leaving their homes—they were leaving behind versions of themselves that would never return. The men who stayed behind were not only grieving the dead; they were grieving the living who had become strangers. Thomas himself, a man of deep introspection and literary sensitivity, would enlist in 1915 and be killed at Arras in 1917. His poetry is often read as a quiet response to the war—not through overt protest, but through the meticulous recording of inner dislocation. “Parting” captures this dislocation with uncanny precision. The “strange land” of the past mirrors the alien landscape of the trenches, where the familiar rules of life—of emotion, of time, of identity—had been obliterated. In both, the self is diminished, the world is silent, and what remains is not heroism, but a strange, unspoken peace.

The poem also reflects the broader cultural shift in early twentieth-century poetry away from Romantic idealism toward a more austere, psychologically complex mode of expression. Where Wordsworth sought solace in nature and Keats in beauty, Thomas finds it in the absence of beauty—the quiet of the unchanging past. His language is stripped of ornament, his imagery is restrained, his emotions are not declared but implied through precise, almost clinical observation. This is not poetry of the heart, but of the mind observing the heart’s decay. The emotional power lies not in what is said, but in what is withheld. The anger, the regret, the longing—they are all present, but they are not dramatized. They are observed, cataloged, and then quietly released.

One of the most striking features of the poem is its use of negation as a form of affirmation. “Wind blows not there,” “cannot hurt at all,” “lacks all blood and nerve and wit,” “no longer woe,” “naught can stir or stain.” These negations do not create emptiness; they create a new kind of fullness. The absence of pain becomes the presence of peace. The absence of agency becomes the presence of stillness. The absence of the self becomes the presence of memory. This is a poetic technique that anticipates the minimalist aesthetics of later modernists like Samuel Beckett, where meaning emerges not through accumulation, but through subtraction. Thomas does not build a monument to memory; he carves away everything that is not memory, leaving only the essential, the unchanging, the unassailable.

The final lines, “That naught can stir or stain like this,” are among the most quietly devastating in the English language. “Naught” is not just nothing—it is the total negation of action, of interference, of change. And “stain” is particularly potent. It suggests contamination, corruption, the intrusion of the present into the purity of the past. But even this is impossible. The past is inviolable, not because it is sacred, but because it is inert. It cannot be touched. It cannot be altered. It cannot be improved. It simply is. And in its being, it is perfect—not because it was good, but because it is gone.

This is the poem’s ultimate truth: that time does not heal wounds; it renders them irrelevant. The pain of the parting remains, but the reasons for the pain have dissolved. The angry words are no longer words—they are echoes. The look that once pierced the soul is now a shadow on a wall. The deed that once seemed unforgivable is now a footnote in a life. And in that dissolution, there is a strange, quiet joy—not because the past was good, but because it is no longer alive to hurt.

“Parting” is not a poem about reconciliation. It is a poem about the quiet, terrifying, beautiful surrender to time. It is the voice of a man who has looked into the abyss of his own suffering and found, not redemption, but peace—not because he has forgiven, but because he has outlived the pain. The poem does not offer hope. It offers something rarer: the recognition that even the deepest wounds can become, in time, objects of serene contemplation. And in that recognition lies a kind of courage—not the courage to endure, but the courage to admit that what once destroyed you has, in its own strange way, become your most intimate companion.

In its final lines, the poem does not conclude; it lingers. Like the memory it describes, it does not resolve. It simply exists, suspended in its own silence. And in that silence, we hear not the echo of a voice, but the echo of a soul learning, slowly, painfully, to live with its own ghosts. This is why “Parting” endures—not because it tells us how to grieve, but because it shows us, with unflinching honesty, how grief transforms, not into joy, but into something quieter, stranger, and far more enduring: the stillness of a remembered pain that no longer needs to be healed.

Sam Walter Foss’s “The House by the Side of the Road” has endured because its central aspiration is at once modest and immense: the speaker asks not for fame, mastery, wealth, or even heroic influence, but for the moral capacity to remain near other people and “be a friend to man.” The poem’s famous roadside dwelling is therefore much more than a picturesque rural home. It is an ethical location, a chosen standpoint from which the speaker can witness human life in its movement, variety, exhaustion, hope, error, courage, and sorrow. Foss imagines sympathy not as a rare burst of sentiment but as a habit of attention. To live “by the side of the road” is to remain available to the passing world, neither retreating into private comfort nor mounting a platform of judgment above one’s neighbors. The poem’s appeal lies in this fusion of accessibility and seriousness. Its language is direct enough to be remembered almost as a proverb, yet its moral vision raises enduring questions about humility, community, moral judgment, and the responsibilities of a self-conscious individual within a crowded, unequal, and often painful world.

Published in the late nineteenth century, the poem belongs to a period of profound transformation in American social life. Industrialization, urban expansion, mass transportation, immigration, labor conflict, and the growth of national markets had changed the meaning of proximity. People increasingly encountered strangers in cities, factories, railway stations, and commercial streets; yet physical nearness did not necessarily create understanding. Indeed, the pressures of modernity could sharpen social division, creating new forms of anonymity and alienation. Foss’s roadside image responds to this environment by recovering a more intimate moral geography. The “road” is not merely a country lane, although its imagery draws upon a pastoral American imagination. It is also the “highway of life,” a route traversed by people whose stories the speaker cannot fully know. The poem counters the impersonality of a rapidly changing society with an ethic of neighborliness. Its speaker does not claim he can solve every traveler’s troubles. Instead, he insists on the importance of recognition: he will see the hopeful and the weary, receive smiles as well as tears, and refuse the emotional indifference that turns fellow human beings into passing scenery.

Foss himself was well placed to articulate a democratic, public-facing moral ideal. Born in New Hampshire in 1858, he worked as a journalist and became widely known for poems that combined plain speech, regional sensibility, and ethical reflection. His writing emerged from a culture that valued the recognizable voices of ordinary people, particularly in the tradition of New England local color and popular verse. Yet “The House by the Side of the Road” reaches beyond regional identity. Its speaker has a distinctly American confidence in the dignity of common life, but the emotional structure of the poem is broadly human. Travelers move onward; some are eager, some defeated; all are subject to changing fortunes. Foss’s popularity in public recitation and civic culture is understandable. The poem offers language for communal ideals without requiring specialized education or abstract philosophical vocabulary. Its apparent simplicity is an achievement of compression: the poem turns a domestic scene into a moral emblem and makes compassion feel not vague or ornamental, but practical and inhabited.

The opening request, “Let me live in a house by the side of the road,” immediately establishes the poem as a prayer, wish, or self-directed vow. The repeated imperative “Let me” gives the speaker’s desire a humble quality. He is not demanding possession of the world; he is asking for the right disposition toward it. The house, conventionally associated with privacy, family, stability, and separation from public life, is deliberately placed at the edge of movement. It remains a house, offering shelter and continuity, but it is not isolated. Its position “by the side” is crucial. The speaker does not place himself in the center of the road, obstructing others or claiming authority over their destination. Nor does he withdraw far from the route in order to preserve a sense of purity. He inhabits a threshold between private inwardness and public encounter. This liminal position enables him to observe, welcome, and identify with others. In this way, the house becomes an image of a self that is rooted without being closed, secure without becoming complacent, and attentive without becoming controlling.

Foss introduces the passing multitude through broad moral categories: “The men who are good and the men who are bad, / As good and as bad as I.” The formulation initially seems conventional, perhaps even simplistic, but its force comes from the final qualification. The speaker refuses to divide humanity into a virtuous group and a corrupt group while placing himself safely among the former. “As good and as bad as I” undoes the superiority that such categories might encourage. The phrase acknowledges moral complexity as a shared condition. Each person contains capacities for generosity and selfishness, wisdom and folly, endurance and weakness. In the poem’s historical idiom, “men” is used to signify humankind, though modern readers may rightly notice the limitations of that generic masculine language. The ethical vision itself, however, resists exclusion: its central concern is the whole human family in its diversity and contradiction. Foss’s speaker does not sentimentalize people by claiming that everyone is secretly good. Rather, he asks for fellowship precisely because everyone is mixed, fallible, and vulnerable.

The poem’s most pointed moral contrast appears in its rejection of “the scorner’s seat” and “the cynic’s ban.” These phrases summon a long religious and ethical tradition. “The scorner’s seat” strongly recalls the opening psalm’s warning against sitting “in the seat of the scornful,” a biblical allusion that gives Foss’s plainspoken poem a quietly scriptural depth. In that tradition, scorn is not merely disagreement; it is a posture of contempt, a habit of treating others as beneath serious regard. The “cynic,” similarly, represents a mind that has converted disappointment into a general theory of human worthlessness. Foss does not argue that wrongdoing should be denied or that moral discrimination is impossible. The speaker sees goodness and badness clearly. What he rejects is the pleasure of denunciation, the stance in which one’s own identity depends upon looking down on others. To “hurl” a ban is to make judgment theatrical and aggressive. Against this rhetoric of exclusion, the poem proposes friendship: a relation built not on naïve approval, but on proximity, mutual recognition, and the awareness that the judge shares the judged person’s unstable human condition.

The second movement expands the road from a literal setting into a comprehensive metaphor for life. The phrase “highway of life” may sound familiar because it has become part of popular moral language, but Foss uses it effectively to connect individual travelers with a universal temporal journey. Some people pass “with the ardor of hope,” energized by expectation, ambition, love, or faith. Others are “faint with the strife,” depleted by the conflicts that life imposes. The juxtaposition is vivid because it refuses to make either condition permanent. Hope may fade; exhaustion may be relieved; the road contains reversals. The speaker’s task is not to predict who will succeed or fail, nor to attach moral value to happiness and sorrow. Rather, he chooses not to turn away from “their smiles nor their tears.” This balanced phrasing is important. Sympathy is often imagined as concern for suffering alone, but Foss understands that genuine fellow feeling includes delight in another’s happiness. To receive smiles and tears alike is to accept the full emotional weather of human existence.

The reference to “an infinite plan” introduces a religious or providential dimension, though Foss leaves it deliberately open. The phrase can suggest a universe in which individual pain and joy belong to a larger order beyond immediate comprehension. Such faith offers consolation, but the poem does not use providence as an excuse for passivity. The speaker’s conviction that experiences form part of an “infinite plan” leads not to detachment but to greater responsiveness. He does not say that tears should be ignored because they have a hidden purpose; he says that he will not turn away from them. This distinction gives the poem much of its moral strength. Its spirituality is enacted through compassion. Whether readers understand the “plan” in theological terms, as divine providence, or more philosophically, as an acknowledgment of life’s immense and interconnected mystery, the poem insists that human beings remain responsible for how they meet one another within that mystery. Meaning is not found by escaping feeling but by allowing another person’s feeling to matter.

In the third section, Foss deepens the life-journey metaphor through an evocative landscape of “brook-gladdened meadows,” “mountains of wearisome height,” “the long afternoon,” and the approaching “night.” The imagery moves through both space and time. Meadows suggest ease, fertility, refreshment, and moments when life seems naturally generous. The brooks do not merely run through the meadows; they “gladden” them, a personifying verb that gives the landscape emotional vitality. Against this beauty, Foss places mountains whose height is not sublime in a purely elevating sense but “wearisome.” The word recognizes that difficulty can be majestic from a distance yet punishing to those required to climb it. The road’s movement through afternoon toward night enlarges the metaphor further, suggesting the passage from maturity toward death. Foss does not dramatize mortality with terror. Instead, he incorporates it into the road’s continuing extension. Life moves toward an end, but along the way it contains rest, labor, pleasure, fear, and the ever-renewed possibility of companionship.

The emotional climax of this passage arrives in the speaker’s declaration that he will “rejoice when the travelers rejoice, / And weep with the strangers that moan.” The paired verbs “rejoice” and “weep” enact emotional reciprocity. The speaker’s identity is not protected by emotional distance; he allows the fortunes of strangers to affect him. The word “strangers” is particularly revealing. Friendship conventionally begins among people already known to one another, but Foss imagines an ethical friendship that precedes acquaintance. The stranger’s sorrow does not need to be justified by kinship, social status, political agreement, or personal usefulness. To hear the stranger’s moan is already to be called into sympathy. This is an extraordinarily expansive idea. It resembles traditions of religious hospitality, democratic fellow-feeling, and modern philosophies that see the vulnerable face or voice of another person as an ethical summons. Foss’s roadside speaker cannot accompany every traveler on the entire journey, but he can refuse the illusion that strangers are unreal. His attention itself becomes a form of social belonging.

At the same time, the poem contains a productive tension. The speaker wishes to be near the road, but he remains in his house. He observes travelers rather than joining them. One could read this as a limitation: compassion from the porch may risk becoming passive spectatorship, a sentimental identification that does not address the material causes of people’s suffering. The late nineteenth century, after all, was marked by severe inequalities of class, race, gender, and labor. Warm feeling alone could not remedy exploitation or exclusion. Yet the poem’s restrained position should not be dismissed too quickly. Foss is exploring a foundational moral act: refusing isolation and contempt. Before assistance can be meaningful, another person must be seen as a fellow being rather than an abstraction. The speaker’s house may thus be understood not as a fortress but as a place of readiness, a symbol of welcome. The poem does not provide a program for social reform, but it cultivates the disposition without which reform can become merely ideological or punitive: the capacity to recognize oneself in those whom one might otherwise judge.

The statement “Nor live in my house by the side of the road / Like a man who dwells alone” clarifies that physical proximity is insufficient. A person may live beside the world’s great traffic and still be inwardly solitary, sealed off by indifference. Foss distinguishes solitude from isolation. The house can offer solitude in the positive sense of reflection and stability, but it becomes spiritually barren if its inhabitant treats every passerby as alien. This concern has gained renewed resonance in contemporary culture. Modern technologies can place people in constant contact with news, images, and messages while leaving them emotionally estranged from one another. Foss’s poem anticipates the paradox that one may be surrounded by human movement and yet “dwell alone.” Its remedy is not indiscriminate intimacy or the erasure of personal boundaries. It is the cultivation of an imaginative fellowship that makes room for the lives of others. The speaker remains himself, in his own house, but his selfhood is enlarged by his willingness to share in others’ joy and grief.

Repetition provides the poem with the force of a creed. The recurring wish to live by the roadside and “be a friend to man” returns not as empty reiteration but as a reaffirmation tested by each new perspective. At first, the speaker states his purpose. He then encounters hope and struggle, contemplates the long journey toward night, and finally restates his conviction with a fuller understanding of human contradiction. The repeated phrase creates a sense of steadiness, much like the enduring house itself amid the movement of travelers. Foss also relies on parallelism and antithesis: good and bad, hope and strife, smiles and tears, weak and strong, wise and foolish. These pairings give the poem clarity, but they do not impose a rigid dualism. Instead, they show that opposites coexist within life and often within a single person. The speaker’s humility prevents the categories from hardening into labels. By adding “so am I” to the catalog of human qualities, he transforms moral description into self-examination.

The poem’s diction is notable for its mixture of the ordinary and the elevated. “House,” “road,” “men,” “smiles,” and “tears” are familiar words, rooted in everyday experience. Yet terms such as “ardor,” “infinite plan,” and “cynic’s ban” lift the poem toward a public moral register. This combination helps explain its lasting memorability. Foss does not seek obscurity; he makes large ethical ideas available through images that can be visualized immediately. The reader can see the roadside house, the stream-bright meadow, the mountain, and the evening road. But these images also work symbolically, allowing the poem to move from scene to principle without losing emotional texture. Its syntax often proceeds by declaration, a mode appropriate to its ethical directness. The speaker is not debating with an opponent so much as articulating the kind of person he hopes to become. The result is persuasive not because it overwhelms the reader with complexity, but because it makes compassion appear as a disciplined, lucid, and deeply dignified choice.

Comparatively, Foss’s speaker differs from the solitary wanderers and visionary outsiders often found in Romantic poetry. The Romantic figure may seek revelation in nature by withdrawing from society; Foss’s speaker finds his ethical revelation at the point where domestic life meets human traffic. Nature remains present in the meadows, brooks, mountains, afternoon, and night, but it does not displace human community. The landscape mirrors the changing fortunes of travelers rather than offering escape from them. The poem also differs from harsher traditions of social satire. Satire can expose hypocrisy powerfully, and Foss does not deny the reality of moral failure, yet he fears that habitual scorn may deform the observer as much as it condemns the observed. His alternative is not complacency. It is compassionate realism: a willingness to acknowledge weakness without reducing persons to weakness. In this respect, the poem shares an affinity with democratic writers who locate dignity not in exceptional purity but in the common, imperfect life that people share.

The final return to the passing multitude brings the poem’s ethic into its most concise form: “They are good, they are bad, they are weak, they are strong, / Wise, foolish—so am I.” The speaker’s self-inclusion is the poem’s decisive act. He does not merely advocate tolerance as a generous superior tolerates an inferior. He recognizes a common moral weather. This recognition is not self-abasement; it is humility, a truthful understanding that no individual stands outside the conditions of error, limitation, and possibility. Such humility has philosophical significance. It challenges the fantasy of the autonomous, self-sufficient self and replaces it with a relational identity. We know ourselves partly through the vulnerabilities we share with others. The poem’s friendship is therefore not a charitable accessory to an otherwise private life. It is a way of understanding what a human life is: a journey among journeys, brief and uncertain, made more bearable and more meaningful through reciprocal acknowledgment.

“The House by the Side of the Road” remains moving because it offers a moral ideal that is both attainable and demanding. It does not require the reader to become a saint, a reformer, or a heroic traveler. It asks for something quieter: to resist the seduction of scorn, to see happiness without envy, to meet suffering without avoidance, and to remember one’s own kinship with people who seem different, difficult, or defeated. Yet these quiet acts are not small. They alter the emotional climate of communal life. Foss’s roadside house becomes an emblem of receptive citizenship, humane faith, and compassionate imagination. Its windows open onto the movement of the world; its inhabitant does not claim to possess the final answer to human struggle, but he refuses to close the door of fellow feeling. That refusal gives the poem its lasting warmth. In an age that can reward speed, certainty, and contempt, Foss’s vision remains a stirring invitation to make one’s life, however limited its reach, a place where humanity may be recognized and befriended.