The philosophy of fiction engages with questions about the nature of fictional entities, the truth-claims of fiction, and the relationship between fiction and imagination. Frege's analysis of fictional names (such as "Odysseus") treats them as having
sense (meaning) but lacking reference (they do not pick out a real individual). Meinong's theory of objects holds that
there are non-existent objects (like Sherlock Holmes) that have genuine properties, though they do not exist. Walton's theory of fiction as make-believe treats fictional engagement as a sophisticated game of imagination governed by rules about what we may "imagine-true." The philosophical question of whether fiction can convey truth — and if so, what kind of truth — is central to the aesthetics of literature. Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if" holds that many of our most important orientations (including religious
belief and moral commitment) operate on the model of fiction: we act as if certain things were true. Related terms: Frege's sense/reference, Meinong's objects, Walton's make-believe, narrative truth, Vaihinger's fictionalism, the suspension of disbelief.